The changing narrative of Zimbabwe’s post-colonial history in the making

 End of the ‘Liberation War Narrative’?

By Terence Chitapi

Introduction

The quest for a post-colonial developmental state in Zimbabwe which started in 1980 has delivered mixed results for the country and its citizens. From the early successes in basic social service delivery to the chaotic but necessary land reform exercise, all the positives have been blighted by the general malaise that has bedeviled the country since the late 1990s. This has been the result of cumulative knocks on the economy from the effects of mismanagement, corruption and the disastrous effects of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) of the Bretton Woods institutions. The contestation for state power coupled with the right to govern and steer development has been dominated by Zanu PF since independence in 1980.

Zanu PF has continuously used the liberation war as a
claim to power.

Zanu PF has won elections on the strength of this liberation war narrative – that it is only those that participated in the liberation struggle as fighters that have an entitlement to govern (rule as they say) Zimbabwe. The narrative has been used as the sole cross-cutting credential in deciding who ascends to state power in Zimbabwe. This argument has been practically cemented through the systematic deployment of former liberation fighters in various arms of government, and not less in the civil service. However, events on the ground with regards the former liberation movement Zanu PF point to a changing of narrative, this in terms of challenging the liberation war narrative that has sustained the party politically to this day. And this new narrative seeks apparently to ride on the new realities of the post-colonial state in Africa where the youth are the emerging dominant demographic majority.

From a socialist state to state capitalism

ESAP delivered a big blow to the
young welfare state.

Zanu PF emerged victorious at the 1980 polls on the back of promises towards building a socialist welfare state based on a redistributive agenda. This was meant to correct the skewed allocation and ownership of the primary resource for production - land – and the adjoining linkages of opportunities driving a modern developmental economy. However, like most post-colonial African states, the Zimbabwean government failed to guard against the intrusion of the Bretton Woods institutions. Zimbabwe was to eventually capitulate to the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) prescribed by the IMF and World Bank as the panacea to laying a neo-liberal foundation in building the modern developmental state. This, coupled with corruption and neo-patrimonial tendencies led to an inevitable deterioration of the economy. The Willowgate scandal of 1989 was just but the protruding tip of the corruption iceberg that continues to deter meaningful economic development in the country.

The land reform though
necesssary, has been used
 by Zanu PF as a political tool.

The inability of the ruling government post-2000 to satisfy the needs of its citizens in the face of dismal economic performance and shrinking fiscal space has meant decreased popularity and a matching increase in voices of dissent. This did coincide with the emergence of the MDC as a formidable opposition to the Zanu PF hegemony. All this while, the liberation war narrative remained a dominant theme as Zanu PF launched the 3^rd Chimurenga, a necessary but populist redistribution of land to protect its self-imposed entitlement to state power. Zanu PF has however over that time metamorphosed from a government holding onto power by means most foul to more subtle and covert means of coercion. Patronage and clientelism top this list. In an environment where formal businesses are struggling, the government continues to use the allocation of state tenders to entrench its patronage network. The neopatrimonial scourge has also ensured that the state-owned enterprises and parastatals that seemingly survived privatization during ESAP have been virtually run-down amidst state-sanctioned plunder and mismanagement.

The change mantra becomes an illusion

Since the MDC was the first party to really threaten the hegemonic status of Zanu PF, it is no wonder that it has continued to carry the hopes of those that see no future in Zanu PF’s ability to steer the country on a genuinely developmental path. The ‘change mantra’ did resonate with a significant majority of citizens. On March 29 2008 the biggest verdict against the economic plunder and underdevelopment was passed by the citizens and Zanu PF lost its parliamentary majority for the first time. Its presidential candidate Robert Mugabe came second best in the first round of polls, scoring 43% against Morgan Tsvangirai’s 47%.

Service chiefs... subverting the
constitution in the name of Zanu PF

It was in the aftermath of this poll that the nation was practically made to endure the reality of what the ‘liberation war narrative as a claim to state power’ was in reality. In 2002, the late Zimbabwe National Army commander Vitalis Zvinavashe in the company of other service chiefs had blatantly warned, “Let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straight jacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will therefore not accept, let alone support or salute anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people.” While in 2002 Mugabe won, in 2008 he was defeated and true to their word, the military led a reversal of that first round win by Morgan Tsvangirai. The liberation war narrative was their guiding narrative.

Sadly, the inadequateness of a clear winner in the March 2008 elections necessitated the promulgation of a negotiated government, commonly referred to as the government of national unity (GNU). While others have argued to the contrary, many believe that the period during which the main opposition parties had a flirtation with state power in the GNU overall worked to diminish the people’s confidence in the ‘change mantra’ as a panacea to arresting the Zanu PF-inspired collapse.

Decimating the liberation war narrative

Professor Moyo argues that
G40 is not a faction but a
demographic issue.

The events in Zanu PF, in particular the factional wars over succession are telling when looked at from the perspective of a singular narrative playing a major part in deciding our national politics. What is clear since that party’s last congress in 2014 is how the claim to power on the basis of the liberation war narrative is slowly but surely being decimated. Professor Jonathan Moyo, widely seen as a leading figure in what is commonly referred to as the G40 faction argues that the moniker G40 is not a faction, but rather “a purely demographic issue that seeks to describe the generation from where the political future of the country is expected to derive shape.”

The faction said to be led by former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa using the moniker Team Lacoste has made clear their views and intentions viz succession. They want Mnangagwa to succeed Mugabe and their choice’s entitlement to govern is based on the liberation war narrative. On the other hand, the faction referred to as G40 is firmly focused on outdoing and undoing the liberation war narrative, instead pointing to the inescapable narrative of generational succession, based on the simple reality of succession by or through age or the passage of time. The roping in of Sydney Sekeramayi by G40 into the succession rate is an indirect admission to the relevance of the liberation war narrative to succession politics. That the G40 faction is itself fronted by younger politicians who took no part, at least directly, in the war of liberation is itself telling of the project to dismantle the liberation war narrative.

For those that have pursued the liberation war narrative as their sole claim to political power and legitimacy, a lot of naivety has also been exposed of their thinking. If the truth be told without fear or favour, it was always really unwise of the war veterans who found themselves enjoying state power to invoke the liberation war narrative each time they faced constitutional challenges to their political power. The 2002 press conference by Zvinavashe and his ilk was a nauseating and sad chapter in the history of electoral politics in Zimbabwe. The very same ideal to self-determination of a people that necessitated the liberation struggle is what this liberation war narrative attacked.

The liberation war remains
all-important as it birthed Zimbabwe.

This is not to say that the citizens do not acknowledge and respect the liberation war, its ideals and what it brought for the country. To the contrary, the citizens are really frustrated with how erstwhile liberators have turned out to be worse oppressors and plunderers than the preceding white colonial minority. For the record, the liberation struggle was against the very virtues that seem to drive Zanu PF as a party and political system currently. After all, so many lost life and limb in that struggle, and these were not just Zanu cadres; in fact more civilians lost their lives than Zanu cadres in the trenches. Those are realities of open armed conflict. And to want to monopolize such a collective narrative as a claim to political power for a rogue few, is the height of hypocrisy, it does not come any worse.

Passing on the baton only way on both sides

2018 main battle will be between the MDC and Zanu PF.

As we face another plebiscite in 2018, it is worth pointing out a few issues. As with previous elections since 2000, we again will witness a binary contest between the MDC and Zanu PF. Never mind the coalition dynamics, they are really inconsequential to that binary contest. Yes, some may argue that coalition dynamics will influence numbers and have already written on that.

Heading to 2018, Zanu PF despite holding the advantage of incumbency has to grapple with factionalism over succession and as well battling the electoral verdict of an imploding economy. For President Mugabe and his G40 faction, his battles will include retaining (a semblance of what remains of) the liberation war narrative. Whatever remains of his tattered revolutionary legacy borrows a lot from the liberation war narrative. He also has to acknowledge the new reality of the youth demographic dominance, with no liberation war credentials. Hence you have the youth interface rallies and the revisionist narrations and counter-narrations of the liberation war history. Besides the fight over the liberation war narrative, the fight is as well very much about passing on the baton to a ‘younger’ leader.

On the other side, the MDC-T (and its potential allies in the opposition) will have to find common ground in confronting Zanu PF electorally. This is their best if not only chance to victory. The MDC (even when considered with its ‘Alliance’ partners) seems also very much faced with the same question of the old giving up space for the young. Yes, the party might have succeeded in the past, like Zanu PF, to stifle debate on issues of incumbency and succession at the top echelons of its political structures but again it is a basic tenet in political organization that can never be wished away. In the process, the opposition has unwittingly become a carbon copy of, as it has mimicked the very same antics it has pointed out Zanu PF for. Passing on the baton to a younger leader again remains the most viable option for Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC-T/Alliance. 

What is apparent is that even if Zanu PF does retain the liberation war narrative in its scheme of politics, the same narrative has had its potency diluted by virtue of the acknowledgement of the importance of the present generations of young people to the political matrix of Zimbabwe. It however remains the duty of every Zimbabwean to guard the liberation war legacy jealously and never again allow a clique or political movement for selfish reasons, to monopolize it in legitimizing oppression, theft and plunder.

The writer writes here in his personal capacity and can be contacted at tchimhavi@gmail.com

Elections and the Consolidation of Democracy in Africa

By Terence Chitapi

Voters queue to vote: Pic: Oxfamblogs

Over the years elections have increasingly become an important indicator for commitment towards a democratic national order for many nations. Suffice to say that for most countries that have made significant strides towards the adoption of a democratic political order especially in the global south, such order has relied heavily on free, fair and credible elections to legitimize the exercise of authority within the nation state. However, increasingly, the same elections which have been used as a defining symbol of democracy have also found use by authoritarian regimes which also use them (elections) to legitimise their rule. This has resulted in an increasing number of people progressively losing faith in the electoral process as part and parcel of the package to building and consolidating democratic rule on the continent.

In Africa, a number of countries have successfully held credible elections that have facilitated the peaceful transfers of power. Senegal (2012), Nigeria (2015), Tanzania (2015) and Ghana (2016) are some recent examples, with Burkina Faso (2015) also warranting special mention having recovered from a military coup to hold successful elections. However, as the Freedom House 2016 report on Freedom in the World notes, such gains have been blighted by the resurgence of a trend of stolen elections characterised by the recurrence of violence, manipulation of election management bodies and processes and the attempts and manipulation of term limits by incumbent leaders on the continent.

The threat of ‘competitive authoritarianism’

A clear guide for elections in Africa.

Of concern, however, is the increasing trend of holding of elections by incumbents which do not meet the basic set standards of free, fair and credible elections, especially as looked at from the guidelines of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. What is more worrying is how as well, fellow incumbent leaders have turned a blind eye to this trend were perpetrated by member states, rather moving swiftly to endorse controversial electoral victories by incumbents, a phenomenon that has given into the coining of the term ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’.

The role that elections play in the making and maintenance of a democratic political order and culture are generally widely agreed.  The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance succinctly spells out how this Charter is premised on the ‘principles of good governance, popular participation (by the people in the governance of their territories), (respect for) the rule of law and human rights’ as contained in the African Union’s Constitutive Act. What it seeks to achieve in essence is the entrenchment of a political culture that is based on the holding of free, fair and transparent elections conducted by competent, independent and impartial national electoral bodies. The centrality of elections to political legitimacy has meant that both democratic and authoritarian leaders all realize the importance of holding regular elections. Where the former group of leaders have allowed somewhat free and fair electoral processes, the latter group seem to emphasize more on the fact of elections being held rather than the freeness or fairness of the actual electoral process.

Electoral fraud is common in Africa.
Pic: Hungarianspectrum

As numerous examples have shown, as in Zimbabwe (2008 and 2013) and Uganda (2016), where incumbent leaders do subject themselves to periodic multiparty elections, these are however, characterised by all sorts of chicanery, overt and covert, that render the whole electoral process a biased charade, heavily tilted in favour of the incumbent. Most of such elections are held well within constitutionally prescribed time-frames but do not necessarily allow for a fair electoral contest as prescribed in the constitutions of these countries. Incumbents bend and break rules all to gain an unfair advantage over their political opponents.

According to the AU’s Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections, while state parties should commit to the holding of regular, transparent, free and fair elections, such commitment must be actualised by State Parties’ ability to, among other basic electoral tenets:

• ·     Establish and strengthen independent and impartial national election bodies; 
•       Ensure there are mechanisms to resolve election disputes timeously; 
• ·     Ensure that political parties can equitably access state-controlled media during election periods; and 
•       Ensure that there is a legally enforceable code of conduct for all those involved in elections.

African Brotherhood: endorsing electoral malpractice by brothers.
Pic: au.int

It is usually in keeping with the letter and spirit of the above four key points that many elections on the continent fail the test of legitimacy according to the AU’s own Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Yet sitting Heads of States are quick to endorse the outcome of such sham processes and continue to turn a blind eye to clear violations of their own statutes. What is more surprising is the actual existence of sanctions or punitive measures to be taken against members states that are in violation of these standing provisions involving an unconstitutional change of government or other such actions that ‘infringe on the democratic change of government' through elections.

The cost of disputed elections on the continent has mainly come through increased instability in affected countries. Such electorally linked instability has also been synonymous with an increase in rights violations especially of citizens who have sought to demonstrate their disgruntlement to the theft of elections by incumbent leaders. Coups, migration and even terrorism all trace some of their roots in disaffection of citizens in the uneven distribution of power, itself achieved through unfree and unfair electoral practices. Increasingly, we have noted growing disinterest and distrust of the electoral process by citizens as the foremost means through which political legitimacy is conferred or transferred from one incumbent to the next.

Zimbabwe: 2008 unity government 

undermined citizens' 

confidence in elections.

The experiences of Zimbabwe (2008 and 2013), Uganda (2015) and Burundi (2015) point to a certain and worrying level of reluctance by the African Heads of State to flex their muscle in rejecting the notion of a façade of elections just to retain legitimacy and the right to govern. That Zimbabwe eventually had to endure a government of national unity after disputed elections in 2008 was a clear example of a failure to safeguard an electoral outcome from theft by the incumbent who still holds key instruments of power. The 2013 election in Zimbabwe, though uncharacteristically low on incidences of overt violence, was a testimony to the emerging trend of competitive authoritarianism as a ‘smart' way of getting the approval of legitimacy from fellow African Heads of States.

The 2015 experience of Uganda was not very different as the incumbent president presided over an unequal electoral contest, where the opposition found it very difficult to campaign or access state media to sell themselves to voters. The main opposition contender had to endure the majority of time under house arrest, clearly meant to deny them an opportunity to campaign. And on Election Day, an emerging trick on the ‘authoritarian menu' was thrust against citizens where the internet was virtually shut down, a step by the incumbent to militate against citizens' ability to protect their vote. Well, the majority of African leaders saw no problem with such blatant acts of electoral cheating and today the Ugandan president sits with fellow leaders at various fora as the legitimate president of Uganda.

One thing to note about competitive authoritarianism is how easily incumbent leaders are able to paint a smoke-screen of freeness and fairness for the outside world just to get the nod of legitimate elections. This is despite the open existence of legal and other instruments that clearly impede and run contrary to the basic notions of a ‘free, fair and transparent poll’ – a biased state media that acts as a mouthpiece of the incumbent governing party, numerous (and often times unconstitutional) laws that restrict critical rights and freedoms including but not limited to assembly, association, freedom of the media and right to access public information, a bench and election management body that are often intimidated and manipulated to favour the incumbent, a security apparatus that work in collusion with the governing party, use of state resources to buy and influence voters, to mention but a few.

Bucking the Trend

Long-serving autocrat of The Gambia defeated

through elections in 2016.

The December 2016 election in The Gambia presents yet the latest positive signal against a tide of a growing trend of countries fitting within the classification as competitive authoritarian regimes who use the façade of elections to legitimize their rule. One key point of note from The Gambia scenario is the necessity of ‘external scaffolding’ especially from neighbouring countries and as represented in regional blocs in helping to safeguard the electoral processes and their outcomes, especially where these face the obvious threat of subversion from incumbent regimes.

Many argue that the impetus for a free and fair electoral playing field must be driven from the internal pressure of the citizens in their countries, and this is probably true. Yes, the citizens of any country must be the first in line not only to vote during elections when they are held but also and more importantly, should be the first to defend their vote through constitutional means. Competitive authoritarian administrations are always likely to seek to manipulate the electoral process and outcome in their favour. In Zimbabwe 2008, results of the first round of elections took a record five weeks to be released, which was unheard of for an election that did not involve more than five million voters. And yet when it was apparent that the election was being stolen, the citizens did nothing about it and allowed it to be stolen.

What it clearly shows is how citizens sometimes get their tactics wrong when faced with an incumbent government that acts and behaves in a competitive authoritarian manner. Such strategies as parallel voter tabulation are vital when it comes to safeguarding the citizens’ vote, just as it is critical to ensure wholesale participation of the majority of citizens in the electoral process in the first place. It remains true that despite the numerous advances in access to information of recent times, many authoritarian systems have also mastered the art of strategic denial of information, coupled with misinformation to manipulate voters. As it stands in Zimbabwe, for example, many myths abound on the electoral process, particularly the act of voting itself, which continue to impinge on citizens' confidence and right to freely express themselves at the ballot.

Vote-buying has become 

normalised in countries such 

as Zimbabwe.

While it is fact that competitive authoritarian regimes have also devised other means outside the electoral process to manipulate voters – such as how access to land and land tenure has become the new ground for manipulation of voters in Zimbabwe or how access to food aid in times of drought is used as an electoral weapon – it remains true that such rogue regimes can still be outdone through the electoral process. What is required is a strategy, unity of purpose and forthrightness and astuteness of leadership in leading such struggles.

The survival tactics of governments classified as competitively authoritarian have increasingly become an open and known affair. For example, it will be known that state media will remain biased in favour of the incumbent, the police and other security apparatus may be used to curtail the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, or to demonstrate, of perceived and real political opponents, state resources will be used to buy votes and manipulate voters or the bench may even be threatened openly to give judgements favourable to the incumbent government, as we have often times seen in Zimbabwe and Uganda. What is required therefore is the tact and strategic thinking on the part of organized citizens to nullify such underhand tactics and defending their right to free, fair and transparent elections.

The writer is the Southern Africa representative on the Management Committee of the African Democracy Forum but write here in his own capacity. He can be contacted at tchimhavi@gmail.com